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The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum Set-Asides
Robert W. Crandall and Allan T. Ingraham†

Abstract

I

n February 2007, Industry Canada released a consultation that outlined a proposed auction design for spectrum
for Advanced Wireless Services. As part of its consultation, Industry Canada contemplated a spectrum set-aside
in the AWS auction to facilitate the entry of a new wireless service provider in Canada; however, it noted that a
potential drawback of a spectrum set-aside is that it can induce uneconomic entry into the market. In this paper,
we show that a set-aside for AWS spectrum in Canada is more likely to result in uneconomic entry than in a
viable domestic entrant into the Canadian wireless industry. Furthermore, if Industry Canada desires another
wireless service provider, there are far more constructive ways than a set-aside to promote viable entry into the
Canadian wireless industry.

Introduction

encountered in set-aside auctions for spectrum. The U.S.
C block auction was a set-aside auction for spectrum, the
consequences of which tied up valuable spectrum in
bankruptcy litigation for nearly a decade. As a result,
network congestion reduced the quality of service that
carriers were able to offer in major metropolitan areas,
forcing the wireless carriers to engage in costly cell-splitting. Furthermore, the continued use of spectrum setasides in the United States has significantly distorted
auction prices and has resulted in the costly creation of
bidding fronts that incumbent carriers have used to circumvent set-aside rules.
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I

n February 2007, Industry Canada released a consultation that outlines its auction design for spectrum for
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) in the 1.7 GHz and
2.1 GHz bands. 1 Industry Canada proposed to auction
90 MHz of spectrum (45 MHz paired) in five separate
licence blocks. 2 The A and B blocks would each contain
5 MHz of paired spectrum and would cover 172 licence
areas. 3 The C and D blocks, which would each include
10 MHz paired, would each be divided into 59 geographic licence areas. 4 Finally, the E block would contain
14 licence areas and have 15 MHz paired of spectrum. 5
These blocks would be sold using a simultaneous multiround auction (SMR) design, which has been used in
worldwide spectrum auctions for more than a decade. 6
As part of its consultation, Industry Canada has contemplated the value of a spectrum set-aside in the AWS
auction to facilitate the entry of a new wireless service
provider in Canada. 7 Industry Canada stated that ‘‘the
risk of having the spectrum bought by all the incumbents is that the opportunity of having further competitive entry into the market would be prevented’’. 8 By
contrast, Industry Canada noted that ‘‘not taking explicit
action to enable entry may therefore have the consequence of preventing entry while taking explicit action
runs the risk of potentially enabling uneconomic entry’’. 9
In this paper, we show that a set-aside for AWS spectrum
in Canada will result in the uneconomic entry that
Industry Canada refers to, and that there are far more
constructive ways than set-aside auctions to promote
viable entry into the Canadian wireless industry.
The implementation of the designated entity program in the United States illustrates the many problems

European auctions have also demonstrated that
spectrum set-asides are inconsistent with the efficient
allocation of radio spectrum. For example, the auction
for spectrum for universal mobile telecommunications
service (UMTS) in the United Kingdom included a spectrum set-aside for a new entrant. However, the United
Kingdom placed no restrictions on the size or foreign
ownership of that entrant. As a result, the set-aside
merely served to subsidize Hutchinson, a large multinational firm that would not require regulatory protection to enable its entry into the U.K. market. Despite
receiving a £1.4 billion break on the price of the largest
piece of bandwidth let at auction, Hutchinson, which
began service under the company name ‘‘3’’ in 2003, has
experienced significant difficulty in the U.K. market and
is not projected to turn a profit until 2008. Therefore, the
spectrum set-aside in the U.K. UMTS auction not only
revealed that set-asides can encourage entry that is not
viable, but also revealed that set-asides can subsidize the
purchase of the most valuable asset let at auction by the
firm that values that asset the least — an outcome that is
at odds with the maximization of consumer welfare.

†© 2007, R.W. Crandall and A.T. Ingraham. R.W. Crandall is a Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Allan T. Ingraham is President, Criterion Auctions.
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In addition to the examples in other countries that
illustrate the problems with set-aside auctions, there is a
more general reason why a set-aside for spectrum will
facilitate uneconomic entry in Canada’s AWS auction.
Canada’s foreign ownership restriction limits entry to
domestic firms only. However, the purpose of a spectrum auction is to allocate spectrum to the most efficient
carrier — that is, the carrier that can use the spectrum to
provide the service most valued by the end user. Given
that a foreign entrant with experience in the provision of
wireless services is more likely than a newly formed
domestic entrant to be a viable wireless carrier, a spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant risks allocating a
valuable public resource to the third-best entity.
Even though Canada’s foreign ownership restrictions on wireless carriers are inefficient, a relaxation of
these restrictions appears unnecessary to achieve a competitive wireless industry. Market forces have recently led
to some consolidation in the industry for wireless services in Canada, but the industry’s performance since
that time has provided no convincing evidence that the
industry is not competitive. 10 Therefore, it is far from
apparent that Canada requires a fourth facilities-based
wireless carrier, and the recent consolidation would indicate that the Canadian marketplace cannot support one.
That said, if Industry Canada truly believes that another
wireless service provider is necessary to effect competition, it would be far more productive to encourage entry
through a relaxation of the foreign ownership restrictions than through a spectrum set-aside. By allowing all
potential entrants to compete with incumbent providers,
Canada would know whether or not a fourth facilitiesbased wireless carrier is viable.

I. The Effects of Set-Aside
Allocations for Broadband
Spectrum in the United States

T

he Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
began to auction spectrum for mobile wireless services in 1994 in response to a 1993 mandate from Congress. The main frequency allocation to commercial
wireless carriers was the so-called PCS spectrum, which
included five different chunks of bandwidth, or
‘‘blocks’’. 11 Two of those blocks, the C block and the
F block, were originally sold as set-asides for small bidders under the FCC’s ‘‘designated entity’’ program. 12
The C block was first let at auction in 1996, 13 and
was the only block of spectrum up for bid in that auction. The end result of the C block auction was that a
number of the designated entities with winning bids
could finance neither these purchases nor the subsequent costs of building out their networks. They subsequently declared bankruptcy, and tied up valuable spectrum without using it while bankruptcy litigation
continued for nearly a decade. As a result, consumers
were harmed by the regulators’ inability to deliver valu-
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able spectrum to the wireless carriers that were best
suited to deploy that spectrum.
In a subsequent auction for C block and F block
licences that were either returned to the FCC or unsold
in the original auctions for that spectrum, the FCC again
used a set-aside auction for designated entities. In this
auction the FCC’s designated entity program induced
the creation of ‘‘bidding fronts’’, which were designated
‘‘small’’ entities controlled by large wireless firms. As a
result, the set-aside program simply did not work in the
manner that the FCC had originally intended because
the FCC was unable to prevent valuable spectrum
licences from winding up in the hands of the economic
agents that valued them the most, namely, the large
wireless companies. The overall effect of the set-aside
program, however, was to increase greatly the transaction
costs of wireless service providers and to delay the
deployment of valuable spectrum assets, which increased
the cost of wireless services and harmed the quality of
those services..

A. The C Block PCS Spectrum
The FCC’s first C block auction was FCC Auction 5.
That auction sold 30 MHz C block licences that were
disaggregated into 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). The
auction began in December 1995 and ended in
May 1996 after 184 rounds of bidding. Net winning bids
in the auction exceeded $10 billion for 30 MHz of spectrum, compared to the $7 billion raised in the A and B
block auction (FCC Auction 4), which accounted for
60 MHz of spectrum. The prices in the C block auction
were much higher than in the earlier A block and B
block auctions, in part, because of the subsidies that were
granted to designated entities in this auction. 14 These
subsidies encouraged the designated entities to elevate
their bids to artificially high levels that could not be
justified by subsequent market conditions. As a result,
many of the designated entities defaulted, inducing the
FCC to offer further subsidies in the form of generous
restructuring options so that they could retain the spectrum that they won at auction. 15 Those options were
(1) disaggregation, (2) amnesty, and (3) prepayment.
First, the FCC allowed any C block licensee to disaggregate 15 MHz of its spectrum for any particular licence
or group of licences and surrender that spectrum to the
FCC for re-auction. 16 For example, if a bidder won a
30 MHz licence covering New York City and a 30 MHz
licence covering Boston, that bidder would have several
disaggregation options. It could choose to disaggregate
one licence (either Boston or New York) from 30 MHz
into 15 MHz. Alternatively, it could choose to disaggregate both licences from 30 MHz into 15 MHz licences
and pay to the FCC only one-half of its bid commitments from the auction.
Second, the FCC provided designated entities with
the option of surrendering an entire C block licence in
exchange for full relief of outstanding debt and any
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applicable default payments. This amnesty option
allowed designated entities to return the licence for the
full amount of the winning bid, minus the initial down
payment. 17
Third, the FCC provided designated entities a prepayment option, which would allow them to prepay the
debt on a licence with the down payments of another
licence, thus granting the benefit of avoiding the payment of additional interest on the principal amount
owed. Under the prepayment plan, a designated entity
could ‘‘apply 70 percent of the total of all down payments it made on the licences that it elects to surrender
to the Commission (‘Available Down Payments’), to a
prepayment of the Notes for as many of its licences as it
wishes to keep’’. 18
Despite its efforts to support winning bidders in the
first C block auction, the FCC’s efforts to sustain the
entry of these uneconomic designated entities were
unsuccessful. NextWave, the bidder that won the largest
share of licences in Auction 5, as measured in MHzPop 19 of spectrum, declared bankruptcy in June 1998.
NextWave’s bankruptcy tied up substantial amounts of
valuable C block spectrum in litigation for six years. The
FCC re-auctioned the NextWave spectrum as part of
FCC Auction 35, which included both C and F block
spectrum licences. Bidding in Auction 35 concluded in
January 2001. In June 2001, however, before the FCC
delivered the licences to the carriers that had submitted
the winning bids in the re-auction, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that bankruptcy law
precluded the FCC’s re-auction of the spectrum, sending
the spectrum back to NextWave, and the Supreme
Court subsequently upheld the D.C. Circuit’s decision. 20
The spectrum that NextWave initially won in Auction 5 in 1996 was finally sold in secondary market
transactions to Cingular Wireless and Verizon Wireless.
In August 2003, Cingular agreed to purchase
NextWave’s PCS licences covering 34 markets. 21 The
total price of the transaction was $1.4 billion, 22 which
equated to a unit price of $1.69 per MHz-Pop. 23 In April
2005, Verizon and NextWave completed a $3 billion
transaction for spectrum licences that covered 23 markets, including Boston and New York City. 24 Verizon
paid $2.85 per MHz-Pop for the spectrum rights it purchased in that transaction. 25 Given that NextWave had
originally bid $1.49 per MHz-Pop for its spectrum,
NextWave’s investors realized a large return without
ever offering a wireless service. Therefore, the FCC’s setaside program kept increasingly valuable spectrum
unused for up to a decade, but it did not promote entry
of new carriers. 26 As we show below, this delay in the
provision of spectrum to nationwide wireless carriers
resulted in substantial consumer harm.

B. The Cost to Consumers from the
C Block Auction
The FCC’s designated entity program has had no
long-term benefits to the wireless industry in the United
States. Despite the FCC’s efforts to effect competition in
the wireless industry through subsidized entry, the U.S.
wireless industry has evolved into a dynamically competitive industry of large nationwide carriers. These carriers
acquired nearly all of their spectrum either by competing
in auctions that were open to all bidders or through
secondary market transactions, which are negotiated at
market prices. Therefore, the FCC’s auction set-aside program was unable to positively contribute to consumer
welfare through the creation of sustainable wireless carriers that provide service to a significant portion of U.S.
subscribers.
Not only did the FCC’s spectrum set-asides not
improve competition in the U.S. wireless industry and,
therefore, not benefit U.S. consumers, but spectrum setasides also imposed costs on the industry, which resulted
in consumer harm. Because the FCC chose to initially
lease the rights to the C block and F block spectrum to
small bidders in small fragmented BTA licences, consumers were harmed by the delay that occurred in allocating this spectrum to the bidder that valued it most.
Professor Thomas Hazlett of George Mason University
and Babette Boliek measured the rate of inefficiency of
the C block auction relative to the A and B block auctions by the ratio of licences returned or resold in those
particular auctions. 27 The authors found that within a
year of the first C block auction, 53 per cent of the
493 licences let at auction had been returned to the
FCC. 28 By comparison, only twelve of the 102 licences
sold in the A and B block PCS auction were resold
within one year after the auction ended. 29 Consequently,
Hazlett and Boliek concluded that the allocation of the
A and B block spectrum was relatively more efficient
than the allocation of the C block spectrum.
Hazlett and Boliek also calculated the social welfare
costs of the delay in the deployment of the C block PCS
licences. 30 The authors concluded that by allocating
spectrum to inefficient wireless carriers, the delay in the
C block spectrum set-aside prevented the sale of that
spectrum to a viable wireless carrier. 31 The authors
found that the delay in the deployment of the C block
spectrum cost consumers $5.4 billion between 1996 and
1998 and that each individual year of delay in the
deployment of the C block spectrum cost consumers
$1.4 billion. 32 Therefore, by attempting to subsidize the
entry of inefficient wireless carriers, the FCC neglected to
allocate the spectrum in a timely fashion to the firm that
valued it the most, which resulted in significant consumer harm.
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A secondary effect of the set-aside program used in
the United States was the emergence of bidding fronts
and speculators. Bidding fronts are designated entities
that are controlled by large wireless service providers.
The two best examples of bidding fronts are Alaska
Native (a front used by AT&T) and Salmon PCS (a front
used by Cingular Wireless).
One must stress that these fronts were not illegal.
Rather, they emerged as a natural mechanism for large,
incumbent wireless providers to circumvent the FCC’s
set-aside program and to control a designated entity,
even if the large carriers did not own a majority of the
bidding entity’s equity, thereby negating the FCC’s
attempt to allocate a valuable economic resource in an
inefficient manner. Specifically, the FCC adopted a standard for a firm’s eligibility in the designated entity program that was based on both de facto and de jure control. Ownership of at least 50.1 per cent of an entity’s
voting stock was evidence of de jure control. 33 De facto
control was determined on a case-by-case basis and was
related to a variety of factors such as management decisions and board seats. 34 Because the FCC’s standard was
unrelated to a large firm’s ability subsequently to effect
economic control of any spectrum won at auction by the
bidding front, these large companies were able to use the
closed spectrum won at auction by the front without
causing the front company to pay ‘‘unjust enrichment
penalties’’ to the FCC. 35
Both Alaska Native (AT&T) and Salmon PCS
(Cingular) were active bidding fronts in FCC Auction 35,
the re-auction of C block and F block spectrum that was
triggered by the bankruptcies that resulted from providing bidding preferences in the original auctions.
These auctions included the NextWave spectrum, which
was later sent back to NextWave as a result of the
Supreme Court’s ruling. However, Auction 35 also
included hundreds of spectrum licences unaffiliated
with NextWave. 36 Of the 422 licences let at Auction 35,
170 of those licences were closed to large bidders. These
170 licences accounted for 1,707 million MHz-Pop. Of
these 170 licences, either AT&T or Cingular won 64 of
them, which accounted for 893 million MHz-Pop,
through their ‘‘designated entity’’ bidding fronts. Therefore, bidding fronts won 52.3 per cent of spectrum designated only for small bidders in FCC Auction 35.
Academic research on the effects of bidding on the
Auction 35 outcome reveals that those fronts had a significant effect on prices paid for spectrum. Peter
Cramton, Allan Ingraham, and Hal Singer analyzed the
effects of bidding fronts on prices in FCC Auction 35. 37
The authors found that bidding fronts significantly
altered prices in both the closed and open segments of
the auction; Alaska Native, by itself, inflated prices in the
closed segment of the auction by 58 per cent. 38 Furthermore, the authors found that the creation of the bidding

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

front by Alaska Native was financially prudent, as AT&T
would have paid $5.24 per MHz-Pop for the spectrum it
won had it bid in the open segment of the auction,
whereas Alaska Native paid only $4.46 per MHz-Pop by
bidding in the closed segment of the auction. 39
Thus, by giving rise first to NextWave and then to
Alaska Native, the FCC’s spectrum set-aside program
twice created unsustainable wireless carriers (Alaska
Native was designed to be unsustainable). 40 The FCC’s
spectrum set-asides were ultimately unable to prevent
large wireless service providers from leasing or
purchasing spectrum allocated to designated entities.
However, the set-aside program simply delayed the sale
of that spectrum to the firms that eventually found use
for it and thereby reduced the value of services available
to consumers in the interim.

II. European Spectrum Auctions
and New Wireless Entrants

S

pectrum auctions in Europe also prove that set-asides
are not a productive way to encourage efficient entry
into a wireless market. Specifically, the auction for
UMTS spectrum in the United Kingdom served only to
subsidize Hutchinson, a large firm that would not
require a subsidy were it efficient for it to enter the U.K.
wireless market. Furthermore, entrants throughout
Europe have exhibited a high rate of failure. This fact
leads one to believe that entry into the wireless markets
is often uneconomical, and that a spectrum set-aside
would only serve to attract entrants that are not viable.

A. The United Kingdom’s UMTS
Spectrum Auction
The United Kingdom’s auction for UMTS spectrum
began on March 6, 2000 and ended on April 27, 2000. 41
The auction raised £22.5 billion, which amounted to
$35.7 billion on the day that the auction was completed.
Five blocks of spectrum, each with nationwide coverage,
were let at auction. The A block, which was spectrum
designated only for a new entrant, consisted of 15 MHz
of paired spectrum and 5 MHz unpaired. The B block
could be won by any bidder — entrant or incumbent —
and consisted of 15 MHz of paired spectrum and no
unpaired spectrum. Finally, the C, D, and E blocks
included 10 MHz of paired spectrum and 5 MHz
unpaired. These blocks were open to any interested
bidder.
1. The United Kingdom’s Set-Aside Led to an
Inefficient Allocation of Spectrum
The A block sold for £4.4 billion to TIW, which
was a joint venture between Telesystem International
Wireless and Hutchinson Whampoa. 42 Hutchinson
Whampoa is a leading international telecommunications firm that reported $4.8 billion in profits during
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2000. 43 The B block sold for £5.9 billion. 44 The C, D,
and E blocks, which were all nearly identical, all sold for
between £4.0 billion and £4.1 billion to Orange,
One2One, and BT3G. 45 The following table expresses
these bids in terms of pounds per MHz-Pop and pounds
per MHz-Pop of paired spectrum.
Table of Prices per MHz-Pop for Paired Spectrum
and All Spectrum in the U.K. UMTS Auction
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Block

Winning Bidder

£
(billion)

£/MHz-Pop

£/Paired
MHz-Pop

A

T IW (Hutchinson)

4.4

2.1

4.9

B

Vodafone

5.9

3.3

6.7

C

BT

4.0

2.7

6.7

D

One2One

4.0

2.7

6.7

E

Orange

4.1

2.7

6.8

The data in the above table show that the set-aside
licence for a new entrant afforded Hutchinson 46 a price
discount for all spectrum and paired spectrum. Hutchinson paid £2.1 per MHz-Pop for the 35 MHz of spectrum it won at auction, whereas Vodafone paid £3.3 per
MHz-Pop for 30 MHz. For paired spectrum, Hutchinson
paid £4.9 per MHz-Pop for 15 MHz paired, while all
other bidders at auction paid between £6.7 per MHzPop and £6.8 per MHz-Pop. Therefore, the United
Kingdom’s set-aside to a new entrant simply subsidized
the price of spectrum for a large international firm that
arguably did not need a subsidy.
The size of Hutchinson’s subsidy serves as an estimate of the amount of the inefficiency caused by the setaside in the U.K. auction. To determine the amount of
that subsidy, one must know the allocation and prices of
spectrum but for the set-aside. Such a calculation is
impossible to determine with perfect accuracy, but an
estimate of it can be determined as follows.
Because Hutchinson bid in excess of £4 billion for
the licence it won, it would have won a licence in an
auction even without a set-aside. The marginal bidder in
the open auction would have been NTL, which dropped
out in round 150 when the price reached £4 billion for
10 MHz paired. 47 Therefore, the price of a C, D, or E
block (10 MHz paired) licence still would have been
£4 billion plus one bid increment, or £4.06 billion.
Furthermore, Hutchinson valued a licence with 15 MHz
of paired spectrum by approximately £700 million more
than a licence with only 10 MHz paired. 48 Adding one
bid increment to £4.7 billion yields a price for the A and
B licences of £4.83 billion — a price that Vodafone and
BT likely would have been willing to pay for the spectrum. 49 Consequently, an estimate of the size of Hutchinson’s subsidy, and an estimate of the size of the inefficiency of the United Kingdom’s set-aside, is £4.83 billion
- £4.38 billion = £450 million. 50

2. TIW Is Struggling Despite Its Large Subsidy
In addition to the cost of the spectrum, Hutchinson
built out its mobile network at a cost of £13 billion. 51
However, due to its late entry into the U.K. market —
Hutchinson first offered service under the brand name
‘‘3’’ in 2003 — it is currently the smallest provider of
wireless service in the United Kingdom. 52
Because its late entry into the mobile marketplace
put 3 at a disadvantage relative to its competitors, 3 has
attempted to add subscribers and increase service revenues by providing additional services such as mobile
Internet access on both wireless handsets and laptop
computers. 53 Furthermore, there is good reason to
believe that the U.K. wireless market was competitive
even before 3 began to provide service. Were the market
uncompetitive, then one would expect that 3’s entry
would result in significant price decreases for wireless
communications services. However, wireless voice prices
declined significantly before 3 entered the market, and
decreases in voice prices after 3 entered were due to
regulated reductions in mobile termination charges. 54
There is a substantial possibility that one of the
other wireless service providers may acquire 3, which is
not expected to become profitable until 2008 at the
earliest, eight years after it first acquired its spectrum
licence. 55 Therefore, although regulators in the United
Kingdom were successful in facilitating entry into the
wireless services market by allowing an entrant to obtain
spectrum in the UMTS auction at a lower price than
those paid by incumbents, the new entrant is currently
struggling despite the fact that it is a large company with
vast financial assets.

B. Germany’s UMTS Spectrum Auction
Germany’s auction for UMTS spectrum began on
July 31, 2000 56 and ended on August 17, 2000. 57 That
auction included 12 spectrum blocks that were each
5 MHz paired (120 MHz of spectrum in total). 58 Eligible
bidders were required to be active on at least two blocks
of spectrum in any given round and were allowed to be
active on no more than three blocks of spectrum. 59 Put
simply, winning bidders were required by rule to win at
least 10 MHz paired, but could win no more than
15 MHz paired. For this reason, at least four bidders were
guaranteed to win spectrum at auction. With four
incumbent providers at the time of the auction, and with
no spectrum set-aside for a new entrant, the auction
rules did not guarantee that a new entrant would be
born from the auction.
Winning bidders included four incumbent wireless
carriers and two new entrants. The two new entrants
were MobilCom and Group 3G. 60 The entrants were not
small domestic carriers, however. MobilCom was a
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reseller of wireless service in Germany that had financial
backing from France Telecom, 61 and Group3G was a
consortium of Sonera and Telefonica. Telefonica is a
leading worldwide telecommunication provider with
revenues of €31 billion in 2001. 62 Sonera, a leading provider of telecommunications services in Finland, had net
income equal to €284 million in 2001. 63 Therefore,
although Germany introduced two new wireless providers to its market through its sale of 3G spectrum
licences, those two new entrants were large companies
with telecommunications expertise in other countries,
and they were not provided with subsidized entry by the
auction.
Despite the financial strength of the parent companies of the wireless entrants in the German market, both
MobilCom and Group 3G experienced difficulty soon
after entry. Investors criticized bidders for bidding so
aggressively for the spectrum and stated that the German
market could not support six 3G service providers. 64
Ultimately, Sonera and Telefonica abandoned their joint
venture, Group 3G, 65 as both companies wrote off the
debt they incurred by bidding in the 3G Auction in
Germany and attempting to deploy the spectrum after
the auction. 66 Ultimately, Group 3G returned its spectrum won at auction back to the German government. 67
Soon after Group 3G’s demise, MobilCom returned its
spectrum won at auction to the German regulator 68 as
France Telecom and MobilCom reached agreements
with one of MobilCom’s creditors, Nokia, on a restructuring of MobilCom’s loans. 69 Hence, the German
UMTS auction also serves as an example of the inability
of regulators to induce new entry into a wireless industry
that is already competitive.

C. Other UMTS Spectrum Auctions
Several other European countries have seen new
service providers enter their wireless markets by first
winning spectrum at auction. As in the United Kingdom
and Germany, however, those entrants have been large
companies that provide telecommunications services in
other countries. Furthermore, some of these entrants
have proven unsuccessful and have exited the industry,
while other entrants have, thus far, proven to be viable.
The successful entrants, however, did not require a spectrum set-aside or other subsidies to enter the market
successfully.
For example, 3G Mobile, a unit of Spain’s Telefonica
SA, and Hutchinson 3G, a unit of Hong Kong’s Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd., were both new entrants that won
licences in the Austrian spectrum auction that took place
in November 2000. 70 3G Mobile proved unsuccessful
and exited the Austrian market in late 2003, selling its
spectrum licences to T-Mobile, an incumbent service
provider in Austria. 71 Hutchinson 3G, however, deployed
the spectrum it won at auction and is continuing to
provide service in Austria.
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A similar situation occurred in the Swiss UMTS
auction that took place in 2000. In that auction, four
spectrum licences of equal size (15 MHz paired and
5 MHz unpaired) were awarded. 72 Because there were
only three incumbents, the auction effectively guaranteed at least one new entrant. However, that entrant
would receive identical spectrum to any other winning
bidders. Furthermore, that entrant would, by design, pay
the same price as other bidders at auction. 73
The three incumbent providers, Swisscom, Orange,
and dSpeed, each won a licence. 74 The other licence was
awarded to Team3G, which was a division of
Telefonica. 75 Telefonica, however, never built out the
network necessary to deploy the spectrum it won at
auction. As a result, the licence was rescinded in
April 2006. 76 Therefore, auctions for spectrum in Austria
and Switzerland both serve as examples that new
entrants into wireless markets are often prone to failure.
These auctions should not be viewed by policymakers as providing a justification for precluding new
entrants from establishing wireless service in already
competitive markets. However, they should serve as a
warning to regulators that subsidizing or attempting to
facilitate entry into the wireless industry runs the risk of
allocating spectrum in an inefficient manner. As a result,
the spectrum would go unused by the firm most qualified to deploy it.

III. An Analysis of the AWS
Spectrum Auction Reveals That
a Set-Aside for a Domestic
Entrant Is Unnecessary

A

spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant would
likely result in an inefficient allocation of the AWS
spectrum. The Canadian wireless market, which is
already competitive, has shown that it is unable to support four domestic carriers under current ownership
rules. Were Industry Canada to decide that some form of
market intervention is required, removing the foreign
ownership restriction and rejecting a spectrum set-aside
for any entrant would be a far more productive way to
encourage entry into the Canadian wireless market. Specifically, such an auction would first determine whether
or not entry is viable, and second, regardless of whether
or not entry occurs, the auction would be more likely to
result in an efficient allocation of spectrum. Furthermore,
the AWS spectrum is new bandwidth that will need to
be built out by all winning bidders. An incumbent wireless carrier would not have a substantial cost-based
advantage over a new entrant in deploying the spectrum.
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Would Result in an Inefficient
Allocation of Valuable Spectrum

✄ REMOVE

Username: mary-ann.wiersma

Date: 27-NOV-07

Time: 9:53

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\06_03\crandall.dat

Seq: 7

As stated above, Industry Canada has acknowledged
that a spectrum set-aside runs the risk of subsidizing
entry of inefficient carriers. However, Industry Canada
does not acknowledge that because of Canada’s restriction on foreign entry into the Canadian wireless
industry, a spectrum set-aside would likely amount to an
allocation of spectrum to the third-best carrier. Specifically, for a spectrum allocation to a new domestic
entrant to be efficient, that domestic firm must value the
spectrum more, at the margin, than both the incumbent
wireless carriers and a foreign entrant. For this reason,
and regardless of whether foreign ownership restrictions
are lifted, it makes more sense for Canada to use an
efficient and open auction to (1) determine if entry is
viable, and (2) allocate spectrum to the best-suited
entrant if competitive bidding reveals that an entrant is
justified.
1. A Domestic Entrant Is Viable Only if That
Entrant Values the Spectrum More Than a
Foreign Entrant with Expertise in Wireless
Services
Any new entrant will be viable only if that entrant is
able to provide a service that is valued sufficiently by the
market so as to allow the entrant to cover its recurring
costs. 77 The value of spectrum is determined by the net
present value of the services that can be provided
through the use of that spectrum. A viable entrant would
need to value the first blocks of spectrum purchased at a
higher rate than incumbent wireless carriers in Canada.
Although it is conceivable that a domestic entrant fitting
this criterion already exists, it is more likely that such an
entrant would be a firm already equipped with expertise
in the provision of wireless communications services.
Therefore, a necessary (but not sufficient) 78 condition for
a domestic entrant to be viable is that the entrant must
either (1) provide a wireless service to Canadian consumers that is more valuable than one provided by a
foreign entrant, or (2) provide a service of similar value to
consumers as the foreign entrant but at a lower cost. For
this reason, a spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant
risks allocating the spectrum in a ‘‘third-best’’ manner.
2. A Removal of the Foreign Ownership
Restriction Would Be Economically Superior to
a Spectrum Set-Aside for a Domestic Entrant
Were Industry Canada To Decide That
Intervention Is Required
Because it is not apparent that there exists a
domestic entrant that values the AWS spectrum more
than both a foreign entrant and/or domestic incumbents, a set-aside for a domestic entrant would likely
result in a third-best allocation of spectrum. Although
competitive forces eventually correct an inefficient spec-
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trum allocation — either the entrant would fail and
return the spectrum for re-auction or it would sell the
spectrum to a competitor — costs would be imposed on
consumers by delaying the consumption of the services
provided through that spectrum. Therefore, consumers
would benefit if the auction results in an efficient spectrum allocation ab initio and avoids the need for the
efficient allocation to be determined years hence on the
secondary market.
Furthermore, we note that the first-best outcome
can only be achieved without a set-aside for any new
entrant. That is, even if the foreign ownership restriction
is lifted, Industry Canada might be tempted to provide a
set-aside for a new entrant, regardless of whether that
entrant is domestic or foreign. Although such an auction
would be more efficient than one that only allowed
domestic entrants to compete for a spectrum set-aside, it
would still run the risk of allocating spectrum to an
entrant when that spectrum would be most efficiently
used by an existing incumbent. Simply put, a spectrum
set-aside for any entrant would potentially allocate spectrum in a second-best manner.
Although there is no convincing evidence that the
Canadian wireless market is not competitive, if Industry
Canada is truly interested in determining whether or not
a fourth facilities-based wireless firm is viable, the best
environment in which to determine this viability would
be one that eliminated the foreign ownership restriction
and allowed all wireless carriers to compete on equal
terms at auction. Such an auction would increase the
likelihood that an efficient allocation of spectrum would
occur, since all interested parties would be allowed to
express, through competitive bidding, their values for the
spectrum. By comparison, a spectrum set-aside for a new
entrant would greatly increase the likelihood of an inefficient allocation of a valuable public resource — an
action that is adverse to the welfare of Canadian consumers. Put differently, it is not apparent that any market
intervention is necessary, but if Industry Canada seeks to
determine the value of a fourth facilities-based wireless
service provider, it should conduct a fair market-based
test of the viability of such a provider rather than force
the entrance of an inefficient provider that is very likely
to fail.

B. Because the AWS Spectrum Is New
Bandwidth, All Winning Bidders Will
Incur Large Build-Out Costs after the
Auction
As stated above, the value of spectrum is determined
by the net present value of profits that can be achieved
through the services provided on that spectrum. Because
the costs of network equipment necessary to build out
the spectrum are large, those build-out costs directly
influence the price that a carrier is willing to pay for the
spectrum in a competitive wireless market. Conse-

138
quently, an incumbent carrier is willing to pay a premium for spectrum that it can easily patch into it
existing network. By contrast, an incumbent carrier will
discount its willingness to pay for new spectrum which
must be built out with new network equipment, by the
price of that equipment. 79
The majority of spectrum used to provide commercial wireless services is Canada’s PCS spectrum, which is
in the 1.9 GHz band. Because the AWS spectrum is
located in a different band, new wireless equipment will
be required to deploy that spectrum. Furthermore, new
handsets that operate on both the AWS band and the
PCS band will be needed. Therefore, incumbent bidders
will be unable to integrate this new spectrum into their
existing wireless operations without incurring significant
levels of investment. As a result, incumbent carriers’
build-out costs after the auction will be similar to the
build-out costs of a large entrant. For this reason, it
makes little sense to subsidize a new entrant since that
entrant is at no cost disadvantage relative to the incumbent in deploying the spectrum.
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Conclusion

A

spectrum set-aside for a domestic entrant in
Canada’s forthcoming auction for Advanced Wireless Services spectrum in the 2 GHz band would likely
result in an inefficient allocation of a valuable public
resource. Industry Canada should carefully reflect upon
the disastrous outcome of the FCC’s set-aside auctions.
Those auctions resulted in nearly a decade-long delay in
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the provision of PCS spectrum to the marketplace, and
resulted in the creation of bidding fronts that both distorted auction prices and were costly to create. Furthermore, the spectrum set-aside in the United Kingdom
merely provided a subsidy to a large multi-national firm
that (1) did not need the subsidy to begin with, and (2) is
teetering on the brink of failure even after having
received that subsidy. Finally, other spectrum auctions in
Europe have shown that subsidies are not required for
entry to be successful, so long as all potential entrants are
allowed to bid.
Although there is no evidence that the wireless
industry in Canada is less than competitive, Industry
Canada should still reject a spectrum set-aside for a
domestic entrant if it wants to determine whether a
fourth wireless carrier is indeed needed. Specifically, a
set-aside for a domestic entrant would amount to a
determination on the part of Industry Canada that (1) a
new entrant is needed to increase competition, and that
(2) the most efficient entrant resides within Canada.
Instead, Industry Canada could use an auction without a
spectrum set-aside to test for the viability of a new facilities-based entrant. That is, if competition and innovation
in the Canadian wireless industry are truly lacking, a
new entrant would emerge from an auction for
bandwidth that must be built out by any winning
bidder (either entrant or incumbent). Therefore, Industry
Canada should reject a spectrum set-aside, which could,
with reasonable likelihood, force the allocation of spectrum to an inferior carrier and reduce the economic
welfare of end-users.
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